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Crew Exploration VehicleNASA Occupa t Protection
Goals & Objectives
    
• Background
• Give a brief background on NASA’s work on the NORIS, analogous operational environments, and 
the Definition of Acceptable Landing Impact Injury Risk
• Collaboration
• NORIS / MORIS development and validation
• Data sharing agreement
N t ti ATD d l t• ex  genera on aerospace  eve opmen
• Human tolerance testing facilities usage and data sharing
• Human Tolerance / Injury Data Mining
• Determine what data exists to assist in validating ORIS and developing refined injury criteria
• Determine forward plan for sharing and analyzing data
• Next Generation Aerospace ATD Development
• Determine USAARL and NASA requirements for new ATD
• Develop proposal for funding   
• Human Tolerance Testing
• Determine what testing would be beneficial to NASA and USAARL
• Determine forward plan
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Crew Exploration VehicleNASA Occupa t Protection    
Background
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Operationally-Relevant Injury Scale
    
• What is the AIS?
• “The AIS is an anatomically-based, consensus-derived, global severity scoring 
system that classifies each injury by body region according to its relative 
importance on a 6-point ordinal scale”
• Severity vs. Mortality
• AIS dimensions include: Threat to life, mortality, Length of hospitalization, Cost, 
A f di i d T /P i i Q li f Lifmount o  energy ss pate , emporary ermanent mpa rment, ua ty o  e, 
and other factors.
• AIS severity is well correlated with mortality/survival, but mortality is not a sole 
determinant of AIS severity.
• Other Injury scales exist for specific injury areas, but AIS is universal
• Why we need something that is “operationally-relevant”
• AIS tells us severity with regard to survival but not SIGNIFICANCE within a certain       ,       
operational context
• What does “Operationally-Relevant” mean?   For Orion:
• What does the crew have to DO during and immediately after the landing?
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• How will a given injury affect the crews ability to perform post-landing and egress 
tasks?
• How will a given injury affect the crews long-term health and flight status?
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Operationally Relevant Injury Scale
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Final Injury Scoring Calculation Method
    
• Calculate Injury Score based on the 
following equation:
Results
IS
SE FS 1 2 3 4 5 6
0 0 100 200 300 400 500 600
0 1 101 201 301 401 501 601
• Where:
222 25.05.025.0 FSSEISScore  0 2 102 202 302 402 502 602
0 3 103 203 303 403 503 603
0 4 104 204 304 404 504 604
1 0 110 210 310 410 510 610
1 1 111 211 311 411 511 611
1 2 112 212 312 412 512 612
• IS is Injury Severity
• SE is Self-Egress ability (weighted to 
greatest contribution)
FS i th R t t Fli ht St t
1 3 113 213 313 413 513 613
1 4 114 214 314 414 514 614
2 0 120 220 320 420 520 620
2 1 121 221 321 421 521 621
2 2 122 222 322 422 522 622
•  s e e urn o g  a us 
Estimate
• Assume any IS 4 or greater results 
in a Class IV injury
2 3 123 223 323 423 523 623
2 4 124 224 324 424 524 624
3 0 130 230 330 430 530 630
3 1 131 231 331 431 531 631
3 2 132 232 332 432 532 632
3 3 133 233 333 433 533 633    
• Assume any IS 3 or greater results 
in at least a Class III injury
Score Range Injury Class
3 4 134 234 334 434 534 634
4 0 140 240 340 440 540 640
4 1 141 241 341 441 541 641
4 2 142 242 342 442 542 642
4 3 143 243 343 443 543 643
4 4 144 244 344 444 544 644
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>0 – 1 Class I
>1 – 2 Class 2
>2 – 3 Class 3
>3 Class 4
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Classification Methodology
    
IS
• Using Scoring table in previous slide, assign 
each injury an Operationally Relevant Injury 
Score
Example
• Describe the injury:
G d 3 C i B i f
SE FS 1 2 3 4 5 6
0 0 100 200 300 400 500 600
0 1 101 201 301 401 501 601
0 2 102 202 302 402 502 602
0 3 103 203 303 403 503 603
ra e  oncuss on, r e  
LOC
• Rate injury severity (IS) 
based on definitions 0-6
20 4 104 204 304 404 504 604
1 0 110 210 310 410 510 610
1 1 111 211 311 411 511 611
1 2 112 212 312 412 512 612
1 3 113 213 313 413 513 613
1 4 114 214 314 414 514 614
• Rank impact on self-egress 
(SE) based on definitions 0-
4
2 0 120 220 320 420 520 620
2 1 121 221 321 421 521 621
2 2 122 222 322 422 522 622
2 3 123 223 323 423 523 623
2 4 124 224 324 424 524 624
3 0 130 230 330 430 530 630
2 (LOC classified as <5 min)
• Rank impact on future 
return to flight status (FS) 0-
4
3 1 131 231 331 431 531 631
3 2 132 232 332 432 532 632
3 3 133 233 333 433 533 633
3 4 134 234 334 434 534 634
4 0 140 240 340 440 540 640
4 1 141 241 341 441 541 641
1
• Injury Score
1.80
Class I
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4 2 142 242 342 442 542 642
4 3 143 243 343 443 543 643
4 4 144 244 344 444 544 644
• Overall classification scale 
is 
Class 2
 
Class 2
Class 3
Class 4
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Injury Database
    
• The following charts detail the results of applying this Operationally-Relevant Injury Scale (ORIS) 
to the injury databases
• Injuries from causes such as inhalation, burns, etc that are not caused by impact are not currently 
included, even though they may be a risk during the landing phase
• These types of injuries cannot be modeled with our methods, and therefore cannot be applied in our 
technical approach
• Non-impact injuries should be considered in other analysis involving landing risk
Page 8
Crew Exploration VehicleNASA Occupa t Protection
NASCAR Injury Classification (1/2)
    
Head/Facial Injury AIS Score Injury Severity
Self-Egress 
Ability
Flight 
Status Score Class
Cerebral Concussion, NFS 161000.1 1 1 1 1 1
Mild Concussion, No LOC 161001.1 1 1 1 1 1
Cerebral Concussion Brief LOC 161002 2 2 2 1 1 8 2,  . .
Cerebral Concussion, LOC < 1 hr NFS 161003.2 2 2 1 1.8 2
Cerebral Concussion, LOC ≤ 30 min 161004.2 2 2 1 1.8 2
Minor Facial Laceration 210602.1 1 0 1 0.71 1
Neck Injury AIS Score Injury Severity
Self-Egress 
Ability
Flight 
Status Score Class  
Neck Contusion 310402.1 1 0 0 0.5 1
Cervical Spine Stenosis 640200.3 3 2 2 2.29 3
Cervical Spine Strain, No Fx, No Dislx 640278.1 1 1 1 1 1
Bulging Cervical Disc 650202.2 2 1 1 1.32 2
Traumatic Cervical Spine Disruption 650205.3 3 2 2 2.29 3  
Cervical Spine Fx 650216.2 2 4 3 3.35 4
Chest Injury AIS Score Injury Severity
Self-Egress 
Ability
Flight 
Status Score Class
Chest Abrasion 410202.1 1 0 0 0.5 1
Chest Contusion 410402.1 1 0 0 0.5 1
Rib Fracture 450201.1 1 2 2 1.8 2
Multiple Rib Fracture 450203.3 3 2 2 2.29 3
Abdominal Contusion 510402.1 1 0 0 0.5 1
Thoracic Spine Strain 640478.1 1 1 1 1 1
Thoracic Spine Compression Fx 650616.2 2 2 2 2 2
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Not for distribution outside NASA; not cleared for external release. May contain proprietary information and be subject to export control; comply with all applicable U.S. export regulations.
Injury Class 1 2 3 4
Description Minor Moderate Severe Life-Threatening or Fatal
Crew Exploration VehicleNASA Occupa t Protection
NASCAR Injury Classification (2/2)
    
Upper Extremity Injury AIS Score Injury Severity
Self-Egress 
Ability
Flight 
Status Score Class
Abrasion 710202.1 1 0 0 0.5 1
Contusion 710402.1 1 0 0 0.5 1
Cl i l F t 750500 2 2 2 1 1 8 2av ca rac ure . .
Scapula Fracture 750951.2 2 2 2 2 2
Shoulder Dislocation 770730.2 2 2 1 1.8 2
Lower Extremity Injury AIS S I j S it
Self-Egress 
Abilit
Flight 
St t S Cl core n ury ever y y a us core ass
Abrasion 820202.1 1 0 0 0.5 1
Contusion 810402.1 1 0 0 0.5 1
Leg Fx 852002.2 2 2 1 1.8 2
Fibula Fx 854441.2 2 2 1 1.8 2
Ankle Fx 852004 2 2 2 1 1 8 2
Injury Class 1 2 3 4
 . .
Tailbone Fx 856151.2 2 1 1 1.32 2
Description Minor Moderate Severe Life-Threatening or Fatal
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Crew Exploration VehicleNASA Occupa t Protection
Analog Operational Environments
    
• We want to provide a context for the level of risk inherent in the Orion landings in terms that 
people understand and have a sense for
• Risk comparison is primarily subjective and qualitative since the actual risk is determined by 
operational differences, seating and occupant protection differences, and other factors.
• For example, is the risk of injury during an Orion landing roughly the same, better or worse than:
• An aircraft carrier landing, 
• a NASCAR crash  , 
• a helicopter crash, etc?  
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Data Reviews
    
• We conducted reviews of injury and crash statistical data from 
“analogous operational environments”
Whil l l diff t i k t th l h• e c ear y eren  n many ey aspec s, ese ana ogs s are some 
common traits with the Orion landings:
• Multi-point (at least 5pt) harness seating systems
• Suited/helmeted occupants 
• Considerations for flail and head/neck protection
• Aviation landings and/or high speed collisions (racing)
• Dynamic landing/impact environments and orientations    
• A few key differences include:
• Data categorized as mishaps often not attributable directly to injury/severity
• Racing is a competitive environment    
• Military aviation may be in a hostile environment
• Vehicle configurations and impact vectors differ from Orion
• Land vs Water landings Controlled parachuted landing vs Hard land landings
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NASCAR Risk
    
• NASCAR crash and injury data provided for years 2003-2008
• 41 total injuries/4015 impact events
• NASCAR crash data recorder data provided as well as narrative 
descriptions of the crash event (for injury cases)
• Injury data including general descriptions and AIS codes provided        
• Data prior to 2003 is less reliable 
• Inconsistent measures and recording practices
f• Incomplete records o  crash events and data
• Vehicle configurations less consistent
• Definitions for NASCAR
• Injury – Reported, known injury with AIS coding
• Crash – Any impact event that triggered recorder
• Sortie – Any time the driver enters the car during an event
Page 13
          
• Assumed 4-5 sorties per car per race event
• Includes practice laps, qualification, and the race event
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IRL Risk
    
• Indy Racing League (IRL) crash and injury statistics provided for years 2003-2008
• 38 total injuries/570 crashes
• Crash recorder data provided 2006-2008 in standardized format Data prior to 2006 may be       .        
available but in different formats.
• Injury descriptions provided
• Definitions for IRL
I j R t d i j ith d i ti• n ury – epor e  n ury w  escr p ons
• Crash – Any impact event that triggered recorder
• Sortie – Any time the driver enters the car during an event
• ~3 sorties per car per race event (based on IRL database)
• Includes practice laps, qualification, and the race event
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Air Force Risk
    
• Air Force crash and injury data provided for years 1996-2007
• Mishap severities categorized by Class I – IV for Fixed and Rotary 
Wing Crashes (multiple aircraft types)
• 85 ejections in dataset
• Flight Hour Data and Ejection Injury Descriptions provided       
• Fatalities/Injuries distinguished in some data but not injury 
severities
• Ejection injuries are often from exiting or windblast, rather than 
landing impact
• Definitions for Air Force
• Injury – A known ejection injury or a mishap class A-D
• Crash – An ejection (fixed-wing) or mishap (rotary-wing)
• Sortie – Total Flight Hours/Average Sortie length (assumed 8 hr average)
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Navy Risk
    
• Navy crash and injury data provided for years 1980-2009
• Mishap and Crash statistics provided by Class A-C for 
Flight/Ground and Fixed/Rotary Wing Crashes (multiple aircraft 
types)
• Fatality rates and statistics provided
• Provided Flight Hour and Crash data
• Definitions for Navy
I j Mi h Cl A C ( t t i di ti f i j )• n ury – s ap ass -  no  a rue n ca on o  n ury
• Crash – A mishap
• Sortie – Total Flight Hours/Average Sortie length (assumed 8 hour average)
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Army Risk
    
• Army crash and injury data provided for years 2003-2008
• Mishap statistics provided by Class A-D, rates per 100k flight hours 
and per 100k landings.
• Fixed and Rotary Wing data provided
• Fixed-Wing: Assumed Average Sortie Length of 4 hours        
• Rotary-Wing: Number of Landings Provided
• Army team is trying to access more detailed information on injuries 
to more accurately reflect injury rates and statistics per crash and 
flight hours.
• Definitions for Army:
• Injury – Mishap Class A-D (not a true indication of injury)
• Crash – A mishap
• Sortie – Fixed-Wing: Total Flight Hours/Average Sortie length (assumed)
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Rotary-Wing: Landing
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Shuttle Risk
    
• Total Number of flights known
• Very small number of minor injuries possibly attributable to landing 
impact forces
• Small number of off-nominal landings within design limits of the 
vehicle, not considered a crash
• No crashes, but landings are taken as the denominator
• Sorties are a launch/landing mission
• Definitions for Shuttle:
• Injury – Injury descriptions
• Crash – Exceedance of vehicle landing performance limits
• Sortie – Number of Missions
• Challenger and Columbia excluded from crash/landing analysis 
(prior to landing event) but not from sortie calculations
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Soyuz Risk
    
• Most closely related current analog to Orion landing system
• There are differences in design and functionality but the similarities are more significant
• Deaths due to failure of vehicle systems may be better attributed to a rate/sortie rather than a                 
rate/crash since a system failure was the cause 
• Hard land landings are a key factor in Soyuz landing risk, raising level of minor injuries observed
• Definitions for Soyuz:
I j I j d i ti• n ury – n ury escr p ons
• Crash – Off-nominal landings
• Sortie – Number of Missions
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Mercury, Gemini, Apollo Risk
    
• Not currently included in comparative analysis
• Injury data not readily available
• Apollo 12 injury due to improper stowage of hardware coming loose and striking crewmember              
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Injury Risk by Program
    
Injuries Per Crash or        
Off-Nominal Landing
Injuries Per Sortie                
(Exposure Risk)
Cl I Cl II Cl III Cl IV Cl I Cl II Cl III Cl IVProgram ass   ass ass ass ass   ass ass ass 
NASCAR 0.36% 0.58% 0.39% 0.04% 0.02% 0.03% 0.02% 0.00%
IRL 1.58% 2.28% 2.46% 0.35% 0.07% 0.09% 0.10% 0.01%
USAF Fixed Wing 57.0% 5.6% 7.0% 8.5% 0.006% 0.001% 0.001% 0.001%
USN Rotary Wing 59.27% 17.16% 23.57% 0.054% 0.015% 0.021%
USN Fixed Wing 68.4% 12.3% 19.3% 0.09% 0.02% 0.03%
USA Rotary Wing 36% 40% 9% 16% 0.0027% 0.0029% 0.0007% 0.0012%
USA Fixed Wing 48% 35% 14% 3% 0 040% 0 030% 0 012% 0 002%  . . . .
Shuttle N/A N/A N/A N/A 0.75% 0% 0% 0.88%
Soyuz 15.9% 1.6% 0% 1.6% 4.1% 0.4% 0% 0.4%
• Using data from other programs, a basis of risk can be established to allow Task 1 to relate Orion risk
• The idea here is to help relate probability numbers to real risks that team members have experience with and 
understand (Shuttle, NASCAR, Rotary Wing, etc.)
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• *Assumes a probability of off-nominal landings of <1% (land-landing case shown)
• ^Calculated by proposed expected number of injuries divided by assumed number of crew landings
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Study Products: Injury Context
    
What is the overall risk of minor/moderate/severe impact 
related injury every time a person gets in the vehicle?
0.0% 0.05        0.1                                   0.5                        1.0            100%
Helicopter
         
NASCAR SoyuzIRL
What is the risk of minor/moderate/severe injury during
Military Plane Orion 
requirement
Shuttle
        
ejections/crashes/off-nominal landings in the vehicle?
NASCAR Military PlaneHelicopterIRL
Orion 
requirement
0%    1     2    3    4   5    6    7    8    9   10    20   30   40   50   60     98   99  100%
Soyuz
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Definition of Acceptable Landing Injury 
Risk
    
Entry Descent Post-Landing Ops
Landing RecoveryDe-orbit Burn
NTS
• What this meeting was not about:
• Improved seat/restraint attenuation systems (Design independent!)
• Biodynamics models
• Specific injury response parameters
• Any Orion-based testing (sled tests, drop tests, suit tests)
• Suit design and Suit-Occupant interactions
• What this meeting did not cover:     
• Injury risk during the following mission phases:
• Launch and Ascent
• On-orbit ops
• Entry and Descent
• Post-Landing
• Injuries (burns, inhalation, etc) unrelated to landing impact
• Goal:
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The goal of this meeting was to formulate a recommendation to the Orion 
Project for an acceptable level of injury risk associated with Nominal and 
Off-Nominal landing cases.
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Define Highest Level of Injury Risk 
Consistent with Successful Program
    
• Everyone has an opinion on what acceptable injury risk is
• Start with defining the highest level of injury consistent with a successful program
C tl B i kl l f i l & B i kl d t f ff i l Q ti Wh t if fi d• urren y r n ey ow or nom na   r n ey mo era e or o -nom na .  ues on: a   we n  
out that 30% of the time we will have off-nominal landing?  Is Brinkley moderate the right criteria 
(less than 5% risk)?
• This is not a simple task.  
• Team of medical, scientific, operational, flight crew, statisticians and outside experts, i.e. military, 
to systematically review mission and medical drivers and come to a consensus on the highest risk 
of injury consistent with a successful program.
• Are five cases of crewmembers with minor injury, which don’t impede egress, and don’t lose flight status over 
the 10 year program acceptable? Are 10 cases?       
• Is one case of a crewmember that has a successful egress, but has long-term health impacts, acceptable over 
the course of the 10 year program?
• To properly do this task, need to understand both injury response to landing loads 
and probability distribution of landings    
• Once the highest level of injury risk consistent with a successful mission is 
determined, then we look at other medical, operational and ethical considerations 
that would warrant further reduction of the injury risk levels
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• This is a long, systematic effort to define acceptable injury risk within 
programmatic and operational constraints
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Refinement Process
    
• Ethical
• Whatever the risk, each crew should know up front what they are accepting or be given opportunity to decline.  
Disclosure is the key.
• Some moderate risk may be acceptable, but not undue risk
• Political
• Given the loss of life from the Shuttle program (unacceptable for low-earth exploration), the Constellation program should 
be 10 times safer than Shuttle  during ISS operations.
• Is the Soyuz risk level an appropriate level for US crews (current accepted by NASA) 
• How much risk is acceptable for low-earth operations (ISS) vs. Lunar operations?  Ref. CARD LOC/LOM
• Reduced funding or redirection of funds and priorities
• Public Opinion
• Public opinion drives political will
I t t i l ti d i tifi d• n eres  n space exp ora on an  sc en c en eavors
• Impact on future generations
• Medical/Flight Status
• Available Medical Supplies aboard the vehicle (limited treatment ability)
• Non deconditioned Crews should be given the best possible opportunity to return to flight status even for off nominal-             ,   -  
events
• Deconditioned crew experiencing nominal landings should be able to return to flight status following a nominal 
rehabilitation period, what about for off-nominal landings?
• Programmatic
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• Assuming the mission was successful prior to the landing event, other considerations include loss of crew medical data 
due to landing injury and opt-out or  unavailability of specimen collections (science financial and technical loss)
• Impact to Astronaut corps (recruitment, assignment, morale, etc.)
• Financial losses to vehicle and systems
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Injury Scale Classification Definitions
    
• For the purposes of this meeting, the following definitions were be used for the Injury Classes:
• Class I - minor injury that would not impede performance or egress,  no long term health risks.
• Class II - moderate injury that may delay self-egress possible short-term health risks       ,    .
• Class III – significant injury that would require assisted egress and subsequent survival operations; 
possible long-term health risks
• Class IV – severe injury and possible threat to life, probable long-term health impacts
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Proposed Acceptable Limits
    
Assumes:
80 Landings over Program 
Life
4 Crewmembers per landing
Nominal Off-Nominal^
EOM Nominal Water 
Landing Ascent Abort Water EOM Water Landing with    
320 Total Crew Landings
95% Confidence
Or 
Pad Abort Water Landing
  
Landing Parachute Failure, High Winds, High Sea State
Pad Abort Land Landing
P(Landing) 99.6% <1% <1% <1%
320 T t l C L di
Injury Class
 o a  rew an ngs
Exp # 
Injuries P(Injury)
Exp # 
Injuries P(Injury)
Exp # 
Injuries P(Injury)
Exp # 
Injuries P(Injury)
Minor I 18 4% 3 56% 3 56% 4 100%
Moderate II 3 0.42% 2 39% 2 39% 3 70%
Severe III 0 0.016% 0 17% 0 17% 0[2]*
10%
[30%]*
Life-
Threatening IV 0 0.016% 0 6% 0 6% 0 10%
All Classes I-IV 21 4.71% 6 100% 6 100% 9 100%
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*Acceptance of recommendations in brackets requires SAR forces will get access to the crewmembers within 30 minutes of the mishap occurrence.
^Number of expected injuries for Off-nominal were determined using 1% probability of occurrence. The current design probabilities are much lower
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Proposed Acceptable Limits For All 
Landings
    
Injury Description Injury 
Class
Expected Number of Injuries P(injury)
23/320 %Minor I 5
Moderate II 6/320 1%
Severe III 0/320
[2/320]*
0.016%
[0 25%]*.
Life-Threatening IV 0/320 0.016%
All Classes I-IV 29/320 6.8%
[31/320]* [7.4%]*
Assumes:
80 Landings over Program Life    
4 Crewmembers per landing
320 Total Crew Landings
95% Confidence (of not observing more than defined # of injuries)
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*Acceptance of recommendations in brackets requires SAR forces will get access to the crewmembers within 30 minutes of the 
mishap occurrence.
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Comparison to Current Requirements
    
Injury 
Description
Injury 
Class
Expected 
Number of 
Injuries
P(injury) Current 
Requirements  
Expected # of 
I j i
Current 
Requirements 
P(Injury)
n ur es
Minor I 23/320 5% 6 0.83%
Moderate II 6/320 1% 4 0.57%
Severe III 0/320
[2/320]*
0.016%
[0.25%]*
3 0.26%
Life-
Threatening
IV 0/320 0.016% 1 0.09%
All Classes I-IV 29/320 
[31/320]*
6.8%
[7.4%]*
10 1.76%
^Assuming current injury statistical distribution of injuries, the total current risk 
was broken down into separate probabilities of each injury type
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*Acceptance of recommendations in brackets requires SAR forces will get 
access to the crewmembers within 30 minutes of the mishap occurrence.
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Comparisons of Recommendation to 
Soyuz, etc
    
Injury Description Injury 
Class
Expected 
Number of 
Injuries
P(injury) Soyuz NASCAR IRL
Minor I 23/320 5% 19 (4.1%) 1 (0.02%) 1 (0.07%)
Moderate II 6/320 1% 3 (0.4%) 1 (0.03%) 1 (0.09%)
Severe III 0/320 0.016% 0 (0%) 1 (0.02%) 1 (0.10%)
[2/320]* [0.25%]*
Life-Threatening IV 0/320 0.016% 3 (0.4%) 0 (0%) 0 (0.01%)
All Classes I-IV 29/320 
[31/320]*
6.8%
[7 4%]*
25 (5.8%) 3 (0.42%) 3 (0.42%)
.
This chart provides a comparison between the recommendation and the applied risk probabilities to current 
analogous environments
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*Acceptance of recommendations in brackets requires SAR forces will get access to the crewmembers within 30 minutes of the mishap occurrence.
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Risk Determination Assumptions (1/2)
    
• Up front assumptions made to drive risk determination discussions:
• 95th percentile based on 320 exposures, 80 landings (4 crew each)
• Full scale/drop testing to be conducted in water land or both to validate assumptions and       ,        
performance from modeling and risk definition processes and will tell if impact into occupant volume 
will change risk posture
• Injury criteria and requirements will be validated with 5, 50th, 95th percentile models, may need to 
be revised later for other mannequins (Note:  current requirements based only on 50th percentile 
metrics)
• Static fit tests with engineering/human factors controls in place
• Safety factors for engineering design are similar to those used in experiences of panel participants 
from NASCAR and military aviation industries
• Hazards such as sharp edges, fire controls etc that will cause other landing and post-landing 
related injuries and risk will be properly mitigated
• Ground based response and access to crew varies by scenario.  These assumptions need to be 
validated with help of ground crews and recovery personnel
• Off-nominal land landing will have ACLS medical care to crew in 30 minutes or less (pad abort)
• Off-nominal water landings will not have ACLS medical care to crew in 30 min or less
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Risk Determination Assumptions (2/2)
    
• Up front assumptions made to drive risk determination discussions:
• Injury categories will be based on consensus of Space Medicine and Flight Surgeon communities, to 
be expressed in terms of biodynamics parameters
• Deconditioning factors to be applied for cases where biodynamics responses and injury likelihoods 
would be affected by spaceflight
• Analysis assumes the crew will perform independently during egress tasks (conservative approach) 
which focuses on the “weakest link” crewmember most injured
• Discussions considered projected probabilities of landing cases, but determinations were made 
relative to “worst-case” likelihoods rather than current analysis.
• Recommendations are process-based and are therefore expected to be independent of vehicle 
design and program mission rates.
• Assuming that vehicle is not designed primarily for land landing and that the design for attenuation 
and protection systems will consider these cases to be off-nominal - therefore inherently more risk 
will be accepted for their actual occurrence
• Application of more conservative (i.e. worst) of number of injuries or probabilities of injuries should 
be bounding.
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Injury Risk by Program
    
Injuries Per Crash or        
Off-Nominal Landing
Injuries Per Sortie                
(Exposure Risk)
Cl I Cl II Cl III Cl IV Cl I Cl II Cl III Cl IVProgram ass   ass ass ass ass   ass ass ass 
NASCAR 0.36% 0.58% 0.39% 0.04% 0.02% 0.03% 0.02% 0.00%
IRL 1.58% 2.28% 2.46% 0.35% 0.07% 0.09% 0.10% 0.01%
USAF Fixed Wing 57.0% 5.6% 7.0% 8.5% 0.006% 0.001% 0.001% 0.001%
USN Rotary Wing 59.27% 17.16% 23.57% 0.054% 0.015% 0.021%
USN Fixed Wing 68.4% 12.3% 19.3% 0.09% 0.02% 0.03%
USA Rotary Wing 36% 40% 9% 16% 0.0027% 0.0029% 0.0007% 0.0012%
USA Fixed Wing 48% 35% 14% 3% 0 040% 0 030% 0 012% 0 002%  . . . .
Shuttle N/A N/A N/A N/A 0.75% 0% 0% 0.88%
Soyuz 15.9% 1.6% 0% 1.6% 4.1% 0.4% 0% 0.4%
Orion (Proposed) 100%*^ 75%*^ 0%*^ 0%*^ 7.2%^ 1.9%^ 0%^ 0%^
• Using data from other programs, a basis of risk can be established to allow Task 1 to relate Orion risk
• The idea here is to help relate probability numbers to real risks that team members have experience with and 
understand (Shuttle, NASCAR, Rotary Wing, etc.)
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• *Assumes a probability of off-nominal landings of <1% (land-landing case shown)
• ^Calculated by proposed expected number of injuries divided by assumed number of crew landings
Crew Exploration VehicleNASA Occupa t Protection    
Human Injury Data Mining
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Human Impact Injury Database
    
• Approach
• Mine Existing Human Injury datasets
• Determine available and applicable injury datasets     
• Nation Assn. For Stock Car Auto Racing (NASCAR)
• Indy Racing League (IRL)
• Crash Injury Research Engineering Network (CIREN)
• Human volunteer testing
• Cadaveric testing
IndyCar DatabaseCadaveric Test Data
• Department of Defense historical testing
• Obtain injury data
• Model data to obtain “normalized” data
• Use analytical tools to model data to “normalize”        
biodynamic responses relative to test setup
• Develop injury criteria risk curves based on database 
information
• Products
NASCAR Database CIREN Database
• Revised Injury Criteria limits and rationale
• Team
• Chuck/Brad/Jeff (NASA)
TBD
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•
Air Force (Stapp) and Navy Human Sled Tests
Crew Exploration VehicleNASA Occupa t Protection
Data Uses
    
• Validate NASA Operationally-Relevant Injury Scale (NORIS) / Military Operationally-Relevant Injury 
Scale (MORIS)
• Create list of know injuries and score them using operational impact (i.e. egress ability) and long-
term outcome (i.e. return to flight status) data 
• Use information to validate scale and algorithm
• Develop Injury Risk Criteria
• Use numerical models to simulate impact conditions and estimate ATD responses
• Use injury data to correlate human injury to ATD response
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Developing Injury Risk Criteria
    
• Testing Approach
• Run human and ATD in same test 
conditions
• Relate human tolerance / injury to 
ATD responses
• Additional info on setup not needed 
since ATD responses are directly 
related to human exposure
• Exposure Approach
• Use human exposure data to drive
ATD data to give 
Biodynamic responses
Human Data to give
Injury thresholds
      
numerical models of occupant
• Relate real-world injury to ATD 
estimated responses from model
• Requires acceleration time histories    
of impact event (estimates OK)
• Requires details of occupant 
protection system and material 
properties ATD model to give Human Exposure Data 
Page 37
• Not as accurate, but allows 
evaluation of ATD responses at 
higher exposures
Biodynamic responseswith injuries
Crew Exploration VehicleNASA Occupa t Protection
Data Needs
    
• For data where ATD responses were not collected with the same conditions, the following info is 
needed:
• Test Setup
• Dimensions of occupant protection system (seat, restraints, helmets, padding, etc.).  CAD files are 
best if available
• Material properties of occupant protection system (foam properties, material types, etc)
• If seat accelerations not available additional info regarding the energy attenuation system    ,        
between the seat and vehicle are needed (dimensions, dynamics, etc.)
• Any pictures to help position ATD correctly
• Acceleration Time Histories
Th d t d i th d l E ti t f ti hi t OK b t lt d d t• ese are use  o r ve e mo e .  s ma es o  me s ory are , u  resu s are epen en  
on fidelity of the estimates
• High-Speed Photography (not essential) can help verify whole body kinematics
• Injuries
• Any information on injuries is needed
• Detailed description
• AIS codes
• Operational impacts of injuries
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• Long-term outcome
Crew Exploration VehicleNASA Occupa t Protection
NASCAR Modeling Techniques
    
• NASCAR and IRL provided measured vehicle 
accelerations from on-board crash recorders
• Outside Collaborators developed custom 
model of racing seats and restraint systems
• First Technology Safety Systems (FTSS) 
commercial Hybrid-III Automated Test 
Dummy (ATD) model integrated into setup for 
d t i i bi d ie erm n ng o ynam c responses
• Simulate crash using recorder data and 
custom models to predict responses for 
driver
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Biodynamic Response Example: Head 
Acceleration
    
• Peak Head Acc: 88.6G
• HIC: 461
• NASCAR Side Impact Case (+Y)
• 36.4 G Impact
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NASCAR Crash Data
    
• NASCAR provided all crash data from 2002-2008
• 4015 crash incidences
• 4071 separate usable crash events (some contained more than 1 crash event)
• 43 total Injury cases
• 11 cases were excluded because injury not attributed to inertial accelerations           
(due to vehicle intrusion, nature of the injury, etc.)
• 32 usable injury cases
• 27 head injury cases   
• 4039 Non-injury cases
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NASCAR Injury Breakdown (2002-2008)
    
Breakdown of NASCAR injuries by anatomical 
region and severity (32 injurious crashes)
Severity Head Neck Chest Lumbar Pelvic Arm Leg
Class I 7 2 3 0 2 2 4
Class II 9 2 8 1 0 4 0
Class III 8 2 2 0 0 1 0
Cl IV 0 0 0 0 0 0 0ass 
Total 27 7 16 4 3 4 7
Total may exceed total number of injury cases since some          
cases may involve injuries in more than one anatomical 
region
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NASCAR Injury Statistical Methods
    
• Modeled 274 out of 4071 of cases
• Use logistic regression analysis 
to calculate the probability of 
injury associated with each 
biodynamic response related to 
h d i jea  n ury
• This is accomplished by relating 
the estimated biodynamic 
i h tresponses n race car cras es o 
the actual injuries observed
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NASCAR Injury Distribution
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Brinkley Model Comparison
    
• Calculated Brinkley Injury Criteria Scores for all 
NASCAR crashes
• Brinkley Low
• Corresponds to 0-0.5% Risk of Injury
• Expect up to 12 injuries
• Observed 2 Injuries (0.08%)
• Brinkley Medium
• Corresponds to 0.5-5% Risk of Injury
• Expect 4-36 injuries
Brinkley Model would predict 220-
756 injuries versus the 32 observed
• Observed 1 Injury (0.14%)
• Brinkley High
• Corresponds to 5-50% Risk of Injury
• Expect 34-345 injuries
• Observed 1 Injury (0 15%)   .
• Brinkley Very High
• Corresponds to 50-100% Risk of Injury
• Expect 182-364 injuries
• Observed 28 Injuries (7.69%)Brinkley
Criteria
No 
Injury Injury Total
Calc % 
Injury
Brinkley 
% Injury 
Low 2404 2 2406 0.08% 0-0.5%
Medium 710 1 711 0.14% 0.5-5%
High 688 1 689 0.15% 5-50%
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Very High 336 28 364 7.69% 50-100%
Total 4138 32 4170 0.77% 5-18%
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Developing Injury Risk Curves
    
• For each biodynamic 
response parameter, 
individual injury risk
1 GOF: 0.9987
R3 = 0.3242   
curves will be 
established
.
6
.
8
• Using these probability 
distributions and the 
accepted risk limit for . 2
.
4
P
(
H
e
a
d
 
I
n
j
u
r
y
)
each anatomical region,  
HSIR threshold will be 
updated as indicated
0
0 10 20 30
abs(x8)
predicted probability predicted probability
Head Velocity (m/s)
No Injury Injury
• These data will then be 
applied to Orion landing 
cases to determine injury
  
lower .95  conf upper .95 conf
 
Lower 95th conf Upper 95th conf
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risk
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Head Injury Risk
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total x-y head movement
predicted probability predicted probability
lower .95  conf upper .95 conf
abs(x20)
predicted probability predicted probability
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Head Rotational Velocity (rad/sec)
No Injury
Lower 95th conf
Injury
Upper 95th conf
Head Rotational Acceleration (rad/sec2)
No Injury
Lower 95th conf
Injury
Upper 95th conf
Crew Exploration VehicleNASA Occupa t Protection
Head Injury By Severity
    
• Using the ORIS, each head injury was 
classified by severity
• Using ordered probit analysis, injury 
probability curves were calculated for 
each class of injury (Class I-III.  There 
were no Class IV head injuries in the 
dataset)
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Head Injury Risk By Severity
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Next Generation Aerospace 
ATD Development 
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Next Generation Aerospace ATD 
Development
    
• Approach
• Determine existing ATD components that meet 
NASA needs 
• Integrate components together
• Develop new components as needed
• Test new ATD
• Products
• ATD design specs and prototypes
• Team
• Chuck/Brad/Jeff (NASA)
Bio_RID II Spine
 
• TBD
ES2re Shoulder and ribs   
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Next Generation Aerospace ATD Numerical 
Model Development
    
• Approach
• Identify models of existing ATD components used
• Develop numerical models of new components     
• Integrate components into new model
• Validate model using physical test data
• Products Sub-Assembly Validation
• Validated model of new ATD and validation data
• Team
• Chuck/Brad/Jeff (NASA)
• TBD
Full Model Development
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Full Model Validation
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Human Tolerance Testing
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Human Tolerance Testing
    
• Approach
• Human Tolerance Testing is most direct approach to determine 
Human tolerance to actual spacecraft landing loads in an 
t l hi l h i l i t (i t h it)ac ua  ve c e mec an ca  env ronmen  .e. sea , arness, su
• Measures tolerance limits directly 
• Eliminates complexity and limitations of using numerical 
models and/or ATD’s.
• Humans
• Determine human tolerance levels to test humans below
• ATDs
• Test across entire range
Volunteer in Soyuz Seat
Correlate ATD   
• Cadavers
• Test cadavers above human tolerance levels
• Relate ATD responses to injury and human tolerance levels 
to determine inj r criteria limits
ATD Testing
ATD Modeling
  
responses to 
Human Injury
  u y  
• Determine facilities / multi-center approach
• Products
• Testing Protocol and facilities lists
Injury 
Risk
Human 
Human Testing Cadaveric Testing
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• Test data
• Team
• TBD
Low P(injury)
Difficult to 
quantify
Tolerance 
Level High 
P(injury)
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Forward Plan
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Forward Plan
    
• Fill in there as we go.
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